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The Two Cultures Controversy:
Reviews and Reflections
By RICHARD R. BAKER
What has become known as the "Two Cultures" or the "Snow-Leavis" controversy
had its beginnings with the now famous lecture given by the English scientist and
novelist, Sir Charles Snow. This lecture, The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution, was delivered at Cambridge University as the Rede Lecture of 1959, and it
immediately aroused a most sympathetic response. Since its appearance, it has been
widely read in England and America, having had ten printings as of October, 1962.1
So highly regarded has it been in England that it has been widely assigned there
as required reading in secondary schools - something on the scale of Catcher in
the Rye or Lord of the Flies in this country.
As a matter of fact, this was not the first time that Snow had expressed the views
which have made the Rede Lecture of 1959 so famous. In his novels and more particularly in "The Two Cultures," an article which appeared in the New Statesman
of October 6, 1956, he had written of the lack of communication between the scientific
and the literary or humanist "cultures" and of the dire consequences of the cleavage
between the two.
In another Cambridge lecture, the Richmond Lecture of 1962, the ideas and the
reputation of Sir Charles Snow were challenged by Dr. F. R. Lea vis, one of England's
foremost literary critics. This lecture, Two Cultures? The Significance of C. P. Snow,
was a private lecture to which members of the press were not invited; but because the
unofficial reports of this lecture presented it in a considerably garbled form, Dr. Leavis
had the full text published in the Spectator of March 9, 1962. In the following year,
the American firm, Random House (Pantheon Books), published the lecture, adding
a new preface by Dr. Leavis and a critical essay by a Cambridge biochemist, Michael
2
Yudkin.
The publication of the Leavis lecture provoked a storm of letters to the Spectator,
mostly pro-Snow, and for the past two years there has been on both sides of the
Atlantic innumerable articles, panel discussions, and symposia pertaining to the validity of Snow's thesis and to the justice of Leavis' fierce attack on him. To appreciate
the nature of this controversy and be able to evaluate the merits of each side, we will
review the essential points of these two famous Cambridge lectures and try to summarize some of the representative comments that have been made since their publication.
1. The Snow Lecture
Snow begins his lecture by telling us that because of just good luck he has had both
sCientific training and literary success. Accordingly, he has had the unusual oppor-
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tunity of making friends with the most prominent men in both fields. It was leading
this "double life" which made him conscious of the differences between the scientists
and the writers and which now qualifies him to speak with authority about the distinctive characteristics of what he calls the " Two Cultures."
For constantly I felt I was moving among two groups - comparable in intelligence, identical in race, not grossly different in social origin, earning about the
same income - who had almost ceased to communicate at all, who in intellectual, moral and psychological climate had so little in common that instead
of going from Burlington House or South Kensington to Chelsea, one might
have crossed an ocean. 3
This failure to communicate, Snow feels, is not peculiar to England, but is a problem
of the entire West, so that "the intellectual life of the whole of western SOCiety is increasingly being split into two polar groups." 4
These two groups, whose most typical representatives are the literary intellectuals
on the one hand and the physical scientists on the other, have such different attitudes
that "even on the level of emotion, they can 't find much common ground. " 5 The
non-scientists regard the scientists as brash, boastful, shallowly optimistic, and unaware of man's condition. The scientists regard the literary group as "totally lacking
in foreSight, peculiarly unconcerned with their brother men, in a deep sense antiintellectual, anxious to restrict both art and thought to the existential moment." 6
Commenting on the so-called optimism of the scientists, Snow says that we must
distinguish between the individual condition of man and his social condition. In his
opinion, scientists are just as keenly aware as the non-scientists of the tragiC condition of each individual man . They know as well as anyone that each of us dies
alone. But unlike most of the literary intellectuals, the scientists think that something
can be done to improve man's social condition. They see no reason why millions
of human beings should die before their time simply because they now lack the food
and medicine that a SCientifically minded world could proVide.
In contrast to this noble desire to improve man's social condition on the part of
the scientists, Snow thinks that the attitude of most literary intellectuals, at least during
the early part of this century, was anti-social and politically wicked. In the opinion
of a prominent scientist, whom Snow does not name, men like Yeats, Pound, and
Wyndham Lewis were actually influential in bringing the horrors of Auschwitz that
much nearer. Snow admits that this pessimistic, uncivilized attitude among the literary
intellectuals is not as Widespread today as it was during the period from 1914 to
1950, and that it is not fair for the scientists to charge contemporary writers with
such an outlook.
After this description of the image that each culture has of the other, Snow develops
his own account of their respective characteristics. According to him, the members of
the scientific culture, despite the fact that they do not always completely understand
each other, have essentially "common attitudes, common standards and patterns of
behaVior, common approaches and assumptions." 7 Compared with other intellectuals,
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scientists have a greater number of unbelievers in matters of religion and leftists in
politics. Most of all, they have the common conviction that they have " the future in
their bones." 8
The members of the literary culture, on the other hand, do not have as many things
in common as do the scientists. In fact, about the only important common note in
their ranks is an incomprehension of science and with this ignorance a strong antiSCientific prejudice. Further, while the scientists have optimistic hopes for the future,
the members of the traditional culture paint the future in dreary if not horrifying
colors. For example, Huxley's Brave N ew World and Orwell's 1984 are certainly
not pleasant portraits of future societies.
The members of the SCientific culture are almost completely ignorant of the world
of books. To them even Dickens is a real challenge, and most novels, poetry, and
plays are in another world entirely. About the only art forms with which they have
some familiarity are music and color-photography. On the other side, the members
of the traditional culture are equally ignorant of modern science. They act as if the
order of nature did not exist, " as though the scientific edifice of the physical world
was not, in its intellectual depth, complexity and articulation, the most beautiful and
wonderful collective work of the mind of man." 9 Snow is of the opinion that not
to know the Second Law of Thermodynamics, a state of ignorance affiicting most
members of the traditional culture, is on a par with not having read a work by
Shakespeare; and that not knowing what is meant by such basic scientific concepts
as mass and acceleration is about the same as not knOWing how to read . Yet, says
Snow, even this elementary knowledge is absent in nine out of ten literary people.
Although this cultural divide is not just an English phenomenon, it is most acute
there because of the English belief in educational specialization and the English tendency to let social forms crystallise. Further, in the opinion of Snow, this separation
between the scientists and the non-scientists which exists all over the western world
is growing rather than decreasing, so that whereas thirty years ago the two cultures
still " managed a kind of frozen smile across the gulf," 10 now even the politeness
has gone and they just snarl at each other.
The only solution to the problem, he thinks, lies in reforming the educational program. Snow compares the present English, RUSSian, and American systems of education by pointing out that both the United States and Russia teach proportionately
more children than do the English. Further, in both the United States and in RUSSia
the children are given a broader education than they get in England. On the other
hand, English education is more rigorous than in the United States, but not as rigorous as it is in Russia. Because of the intense specialization for an elite which has
been characteristic of English university education for so many years, the chasm
between scientists and the literary intellectuals is deeper in England than in any other
western country. Snow thinks that we in the United States are trying to remedy the
defects in our educational system, but he seems somewhat pessimistic about the chances
of reversing the traditional pattern in his own country.
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After pointing out that the causes which have brought a bout the two separate cultures are many, deep, and complex, Snow directs our attention to something which
is not so much a cause as a correlative. It is the fact that "western intellectuals have
never tried, wanted, or been able to understand the industrial revolution , much less
accept it. " II Making a metaphorical reference to the group of mechanics who went
about destroying machinery in the English midlands during the early years of the
nineteenth century, Snow calls modern literary intellectuals " natural Luddites."
In his opinion, neither English nor American intellectuals of the last century appreciated the real nature and importance of the industrial revolution . Even when a
few of them did take notice of it, they disliked what they saw. Consequently, very
little of the talent and imagination of the educated men of the time went back into the
revolution which was producing the wealth. In England the young men were trained
for politiCS, for colonial administration, or simply to be cultivated members of the
traditional culture. Even in the United States the pure scientists were not interested in
what was going on, and whatever technical advances there were back of the industrial
progress were the result of the chance discoveries of cranks, handymen, clever workmen, and "inventors. " Only in Germany was science considered an important part
of a university education, and the graduates from German universities made considerable fortunes as technologists in England and the United States.
The so-called intellectuals, however, were completely unaware that a revolution
was taking place. The writers, as we have seen, noticed only the dirt and the smoking
chimneys, and most of them, like Ruskin, Morris, Thoreau, Emerson, and Lawrence,
preached various forms of escapism - which were "not in effect more than screams
of horror. " 12 Only Ibsen among the writers seems to have known what the industrial
revolution was all about.
According to Snow, the most obvious truth to realize when trying to understand
the industrial revolution is that industrialization is the only hope of the poor. Despite
the sneers of the aesthetes and the revulsion of the literary intellectuals, the laboring
men in England and America were far better off in the latter part of the nineteenth
century than their fathers and grandfathers had ever been as agricultural workers.
And today there is Simply no comparison between the lot of the worker in the highly
industrialized countries of the West and that of the wretched million in the rest of
the world.
In the advanced countries, we have realized in a rough and ready way what
the old industrial revolution brought with it. A great increase of population,
because applied science went hand in hand with medical science and medical
care. Enough to eat, for a similar reason. Everyone able to read and write,
because industrial society can 't work without. Health, food , education; nothing
but the industrial revolution could have spread them right down to the very
poor. 13
But, says Snow, if it was unfortunate that hardly any of the intellectuals of the
last century appreciated the true nature of the old industrial revolution, the failure
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of nearly everybody to comprehend the nature of the new scientific revolution is
leading us to a really tragic consequence. He distinguishes between the two revolutions
by describing the older one as the employment of men and women in factories where
they operated machines making goods which other men and women distributed; the
new one as the result of the application of real science (not the casual ideas of inventors) to industry, whereby we have an industrial society of atomic energy, electronics, and automation. This new society, even though it has grown out of the older,
differs from it in kind, and it will completely transform our lives.
Yet hardly any educated person understands the nature of this new SOCiety, specifically the nature of modern industrial production and the new personal relations which
it involves. Even the pure scientists are for the most part ignorant of what the men
of applied science and modern engineering skill are doing and what they will be
dOing. Snow admits that under the press of circumstances, as during World War II,
a great many scientists did learn something about productive industry; but the vast
majority of even the reputed to be educated members of our society is Simply unable
to cope with the complexities of the scientific revolution.
Returning to the idea of reform in education as the only hope of solving the problem, Snow expresses the opinion that because the Russians and the Americans are
more sensitive than the English to the demands of the modern world, they are taking
more drastic steps to change their educational programs. In comparing the three
educational systems, he thinks that the Russians, although they might possibly be
over-doing the emphasis on the number of engineers, "have a deeper inSight into the
scientific revolution that we (English) have, or than the Americans have." 14 Consequently, the gap between the two cultures is not as wide in Russia as in the western
countries. In their art they are able to cope with the subject of production processes,
and in one of their novels an engineer "is as acceptable, so it seems, as a psychiatrist in an American one." 15 In short, the Russians have rightly judged what kind
of educated men and women a country needs to survive in the new scientific society:
the right proportion of pure scientists, engineers, technicians to support the productive
effort, and the necessary politicians and administrators educated at least sufficiently
to know what the scientists are talking about.
Snow predicts that unless the western world educates itself to cope with the scientific
revolution, it will suffer a steep decline within the time span of the present generation.
To give weight to his prediction, he reminds us of what happened to another state
at another time.
I can't help thinking of the Venetian Republic in their last half-century. Like us,
they had once been fabulously lucky. They had become rich, as we did, by accident. They had acquired immense political skill, just as we have. A good
many of them were tough-minded, realistic, patriotic men. They knew, just as
clearly as we know, that the current of history had begun to flow against them.
Many of them gave their minds to working out ways to keep going. It would
have meant breaking the pattern into which they had crystallized. They were
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fond of the pattern, just as we are fond of ours. They never found the will to
break it. 16
Although Snow admits that the similarity with the Venetian Republic is greater in
the case of England than in our own case, still he maintains that the situation in
the United States is proportionately grave, and that we have a long, rough road
to travel before we are as well prepared for the scientific revolution as the Russians are.
In the concluding part of his lecture, Snow warns us that the impoverished masses
in the non-industrialized countries of Asia and Africa are no longer resigned to their
condition. So speeded up is the rate of social change in this century that, unlike their
ancestors' patient hope for something better in a distant tomorrow, their insistent
demand is for something very much better right now. Today's masses are much
impressed by the fact that the industrialization of Russia was a matter of about forty
years and that it will probably take the Chinese only about half that time. They now
realize that social transformation is no longer a matter of centuries, but of less than
a lifetime. In fact, according to Snow, "it is technically possible to carry out the
scientific revolution in India, Africa, Southeast Asia, Latin America, the Middle East,
within fifty years." 17
For such a revolution to take place in a peaceful way, however, rather than through
the inevitable alternative of war and starvation, these countries must have outside help
in the form of capital, trained scientists and engineers, and everything that is needed
to inaugurate a new educational program. As a matter of fact, there are only two
possible sources for the capital - the West (mainly the United States) and Russia.
Neither country could supply this capital except with tremendous sacrifice; even if
they did it jointly, the sacrifice would be significant. In the matter of trained scientists
and engineers, the Russians, because of their educational system, have a considerable
edge. They already have such men to spare, while England and the United States
would have to begin producing the required number. The time for simply sending
these people a St. Francis Xavier or a Dr. Schweitzer is past!
The plain truth is that if the West doesn't help in the industrial transformation of
these countries, the Communists will; and if that happens, then the West will have
failed, both practically and morally. With its divided culture, however, the West
is presently unable either to see the true gravity of the situation or to do much about
it. To give ourselves at least a fighting chance to cope with the problem, therefore,
we must try to close this gap between the two cultures. To do this, we must make a
drastic revision of our educational program - and time is running out on us.
It is on this note that Snow ends his lecture. In short, he is telling us that the chasm
between the two cultures has ceased to be a joking matter or even a matter of only
academic concern. It is actually something which is bringing about tragic consequences of world-wide proportions.
II.

The Leavis Lecture

Let us now turn to the other famous Cambridge lecture in which Dr. Leavis gives
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us his appraisal of the ideas presented by Sir Charles Snow. Leavis loses no time
in letting the reader know quite clearly what will be the general tone of this evaluation by remarking at the outset that if confidence in oneself as a master-mind is
genius, then Snow certainly is one. But, says Leavis, this self-assurance is without
any foundation, for Snow is "portentously ignorant." He might know what a machine tool is or what the Second Law of Thermodynamics is about,
But of history, of the nature of civilization and the history of its recent developments, of the human history of the Industrial Revolution, of the human significance entailed in that revolution, of literature, of the nature of that kind of
collaborative human creativity of which literature is the type, it is hardly an
exaggeration to say that Snow exposes complacently a complete ignorance. 18
In short, says Leavis, he not only is not a genius, he is "intellectually as undistinguished as it is possible to be." 19
Leavis regards Snow's ignorance as portentous because, in spite of it, Snow has
achieved a world-wide reputation as both a novelist and a scientist. This public acclaim is itself a sign of how debased modern culture has actually become. A truly
distingUished mind, says Leavis, influences the world positively and creatively, but
Snow's relation to his time is characterized by "blindness, unconsciousness and automatism." 20 It is the fact that such a person should be held in such esteem on both
sides of the Atlantic that Leavis finds terrifying, and which, in his opinion, justifies
his own harsh attack on Snow.
The ensuing attack leaves very little of Snow untouched. Leavis first points out
by way of a general criticism that Snow's lecture "exhibits an utter lack of intellectual
distinction and an embarrassing vulgarity of style." 21 Next he questions strongly
Snow's presumption to speak authoritatively about the two cultures. For he is certainly not a novelist; in fact, he "can't be said to know what a novel is." 22 Leavis
cuttingly wonders if there is truth in the report that Snow's novels are composed by
an electronic brain into which instructions are fed in the form of chapter-headings.
According to Leavis, inept dialogue, characters that don't live, and stories filled with
"cultureless banality" are the most noteworthy features of a typical Snow novel.
On the other hand, neither is there any evidence, either from his fiction or from
his lecture, that Snow has any competence as a scientist. In fact, says Leavis, "as
far as the internal evidence goes, the lecture was conceived and written by someone
who had not had the advantage of an intellectual discipline of any kind." 23 If, as
Snow has stated, the argumentative discourse of the scientific culture is almost always at a "higher conceptual level than literary persons' arguments," 24 then he
stands condemned by his own criterion - for his argument in the Rede Lecture is
at a much lower conceptual level than Leavis says he would tolerate even in one
of his pupil's literary essays.
After this rather sweeping castigation of Snow for his claim to be an authoritative
voice for both the literary and the SCientific cultures, Leavis proceeds to more specific
charges. First of all, he points out that Snow erroneously seems to think that the
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members of the literary culture are the pseudo-intellectuals of the New Statesman
circle and of the modish literary world whose works are reviewed in the Sunday
papers. Rather, says Leavis, these counterfeit intellectuals are actually enemies of
art and life, persons whom "those genuinely interested in literature can only regard
with contempt and resolute hostility." 25
Further, Leavis notes, without even realizing that he has done so, Snow shifts from
the term "literary culture" to the term "traditional culture" as though they signified
identical things. This unawareness is further proof of Snow's complete ignorance of
both history and literature. Such frightening ignorance is still more plainly revealed
when he asserts that the members of the traditional culture were either unmindful of
or disgusted by the Industrial Revolution.
Turning to Snow's analysis of the scientific culture, Leavis ridicules the statement
that, despite some real differences, the members of this culture "without thinking
about it respond alike." 26 If this abstention from thinking is truly characteristic of
the scientific culture, then, as a member of this culture, Snow is hardly qualified to
advise us on matters which surely require much strenuous thinking.
This absence of real thinking on the part of Snow, continues Leavis, is made most
evident by his use of the cliche: Such statements as "History is merciless to failure,"
"They (the scientists) have the future in their bones," "They (the literary people)
are natural Luddites," etc., simply reveal the unwarranted assumptions, the unthinking
attitudes, and the ignorances of the cultural world to which Snow belongs. Such
racy propositions beg the very questions and dismiss the very issues which demand
discussion. The cliche that literary artists are" natural Luddites," by its very inaccuracy, reveals the true position of Snow as a man who is contemptuous of moral
and spiritual values. For such a notion implies that
if you insist on the need for any other kind of concern, entailing forethought,
action and provision, about the human future - any other kind of misgiving
- than that which talks in terms of productivity, material standards of living,
hygienic and technological progress, then you are a Luddite. 27
This condemnation of the literary artists, adds Leavis, is an odd position for one
who thinks of himself as a major novelist - but then "Snow not only hasn 't in him
the beginnings of a novelist; he is utterly without a glimmer of what creative literature
. or why It' matters. ,,28
IS,
For Leavis, however, the supreme cliche' unthinkingly tossed off by Snow is his
statement to the effect that, unlike the members of the literary tradition, the scientists
see no reason why, just because the individual condition is tragic (for each man
dies alone), so must the social condition be. What, asks Leavis, is the social condition
that is separate from the individual condition; what social hope makes it possible
for any individual to escape his own private tragic condition?
As a matter of fact, it is precisely this inability to realize that only individuals are
truly real and alive, and that" individual lives cannot be segregated or equated or
dealt with quantitatively in any way" 29 which is the typical blindness of our civiliza-
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tion and which the truly creative writers are trying to overcome. Leavis singles out
D . H. Lawrence as the greatest of those who in our century have emphasized the
spiritual uniqueness of each individual and have pointed out the confusion in the
minds of those who, like Snow, see man only as a unit of the social group. In this
respect, says Leavis, Snow is the spiritual son of H. G. Wells and a brother of Bertrand
Russell.
It is because of his narrow view of human nature and human needs that Snow is
completely ignorant of what literature really is. He fails to understand that the great
writer makes us truly live as human beings by forcing us to examine life and to ask
the great questions about the nature and purpose of human life. He fails to appreciate
the complexity of the spiritual crisis in the human soul which accompanied the Industrial Revolution, but which has been a matter of the greatest concern to almost
every literary artist from Dickens and Ruskin to Lawrence. Unlike Snow, these men
knew that human welfare is not merely a matter of improved technology and hygiene.
Leavis wants it clearly understood that there is no desire on his part "to reverse
the accelerating movement of external civilization; " 30 nor does he think that Snow
is wrong in advocating more scientific education. He does think, however, that such
concern is not enough. To imagine that by extending to the rest of the world the
kind of material prosperity and leisure enjoyed by our well-to-do working class we
will bring about a world-wide utopia is to be truly blind to the real needs of human
nature. In the opinion of Leavis, we in the western world who already have what
Snow calls "jam" are obViously incapable of using our leisure in any but essentially
passive ways. For we are spiritually impoverished, empty, and bored. And if this is
the condition of those of us who already have the technological benefits which Snow
wants for all mankind, then such feliCity "cannot be regarded by a fully human
mind as a matter for happy contemplation. " 3 1 In short, what Snow regards as
"jam" turns out to be a disappointingly tasteless spread.
The truth of the matter is that science and technology, rather than being the salvation of mankind, will actually create problems of a staggering complexity.
The advance of science and technology means a human future of change so
rapid and of such kinds, of tests and challenges so unprecedented, of deCisions
and possible non-decisions so momentous and insidious in their consequences,
that mankind ... will need to be in full intelligent possession of its full humanity
... What we need, and shall continue to need not less, is something with the
livingness of the deepest vital instinct; as intelligence, a power ... of creative
response to the new challenges of time; something that is alien to either of Snow's
cultures. 32
This "creative response" presupposes the creation of the human world, that world
without which the erection of the scientific edifice itself would not have been possible.
Leavis is convinced that it is in the study of literature that we come to recognize the
nature and priority of this truly human world. It is in such a study that we are able
creatively to collaborate with those who have understood the real meaning of human
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life. Finally, it is in the response of individual minds to their common literary heritage
that a truly human community is established and renewed, and a truly human life
can be lived.
Leavis concludes his lecture by affirming that "for the sake of our humanity ... for
the sake of a human future, we must do, with intelligent resolution and with faith,
all we can to maintain the full life in the present ... of our transmitted culture." 33
ThiS, according to Leavis, is the essential function of a university; which should be,
therefore, not as Snow would have it, a collection of specialist departments, but a
centre of human consciousness, perception, knowledge, judgment, and responsibility,
exercising a creatively critical function on the contemporary intellectual-cultural
frontier.
As we noted at the outset, Leavis had added a prefatory note to the Random House
edition of his lecture, chiefly for the benefit of American readers. In this preface he
admits that the lecture has provoked much adverse comment on the part of Snow's
supporters. But, says Leavis, the "angry, abusive and strikingly confident" nature of
these comments is itself indicative of the low state to which contemporary culture has
fallen. The very fact that an ignoramus like Snow should have so many supporters
is simply a sign of the times.
Leavis proceeds to deny the charge that his attack on Snow was unnecessarily cruel
and calculated to cause pain. He does not deny that his remarks were severe, but he
disclaims any personal animus toward Snow. Rather it is what Snow stands for and
the uncritical mentality that thinks of him as a sage that is deserving of such a
severe attack. In this connection Leavis blames, among other off-shoots of the Industrial Revolution, the mass media of communication like the B.B.C., the Sunday papers
and the intellectual weeklies, for the publicity-work which has made a person of no
talent whatever into a great public figure. These organs make a show of observing
high standards of taste and education, but actually they cater to a public with little
or no critical judgment.
Unfortunately, says Leavis, in the tight little island of Great Britain, if not in America,
there is a clique which regards itself as the elite among literary artists and which is
qUick to defend its members against any criticism. This clique (Leavis mentions only
Dame Edith Sitwell by name) influences the B.B.C., such periodicals as The Listener
and the New Statesman, the British Council (a promotion agency for British culture),
and even the universities. It is the metropolitan literary world controlled by this
clique which has fostered the image of Snow as a major novelist and sage, and
which, by its control of practically all the organs of communication, can stifle all
adverse criticism of its hero. Leavis is convinced that this whole unhealthy situation
is simply a cultural consequence of the technological revolution.

III. Reviews and Comments
Now that we have summarized the two original lectures, let us examine some of the
more noteworthy articles and reviews which have dealt with the ideas of Sir Charles
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Snow and Dr. Leavis and with the merits of their controversy.
First of all we will consider the article by Michael Yudkin, an essay called " Sir
Charles Snow 's Rede Lecture. " This essay originally appeared in the Cambridge
Review, and, as noted above, it was reprinted along with Dr. Leavis ' lecture in the
Random House publication. Leavis asserts in the preface that he was not aware of
the existence of Yudkin's essay until after he had given his lecture and that Yudkin
had written his criticism of Snow long before that lecture.
Yudkin begins his essay by pointing out that Snow neither defines what he means
by " culture" nor explains the causes of the cultural dichotomy between the scientists
and the humanists. Further, he shifts from the term " literary culture" to " traditional
culture" without any explanation of what the latter denotes.
The nature of the traditional culture thus becomes rather mysteriOUS; it starts
as the preserve of literary intellectuals, but soon becomes the whole range of
non-scientific intellectual activity. 34
Nor is Snow correct in his notion that communication within each of these two cultures is on a high level and that the only noteworthy gap is between the scientist and
the non-scientist. According to Yudkin, there are just as many non-scientists such as
lawyers and economists who are ignorant of literature and art as there are scientists
in that condition. Actually, rather than just two cultures, there are unfortunately dozens.
Yudkin agrees with Snow that there is a mutual failure of contact and comprehenSion
between scientists and non-scientists and that this chasm is universally to be regretted,
but he seriously doubts that any Significant improvement can be made in the situation.
For, says Yudkin, it is not simply a matter of the scientist learning to read Dickens,
to hear Mozart, and to see a Titian on the one hand, and the non-scientist learning
the meaning of the Second Law of ThermodynamiCS or acceleration on the other.
There is simply no eqUivalence between an artistic expression and a scientific finding.
Merely learning a lot of scientific facts of itself is without value. But
What would be of value is an understanding of the processes and manner of
scientific thinking; for it is the nature of scientific judgment, the habit of a peculiar form of critical thought, which is characteristic of the scientific culture,
which makes scientific work a worthwhile intellectual activity and, incidentally,
would give science some value as a disciplined study for the non-scientist. 35
Unfortunately, however, the non-scientist will never truly understand this scientific
procedure, this scientific habit and method merely by attending lectures on the subject
or by reading Bacon, Descartes, Hume, and Mill. He would at least have to take a
full college course in natural science, or ideally, he would have to actually do a
piece of scientific research himself.
The scientist, on the other hand, can much more easily bridge the gulf. In his
case it is easy enough to reduce the intensity of specialization and to give him opportunities to read the literary greats and to study the history of art and music.
Yudkin is convinced, however, that the bridge over the gulf is a one-way bridge,
and that " a useful scientifiC education of the non-scientists is not a practical aim." 36
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But although it is practically impossible to educate arts students along scientific
lines, this is not so deplorable as might be thought. For, according to Yudkin,
there are, after all, only two possible aims for education: one is entirely practical, a matter of teaching what is necessary for living in a community, while
the other is less tangible, a matter of helping the student to become a more
sociable, or aware, or sympathetic person. 37
To have these qualities, a person simply must learn to form satisfactory relationships with other people, to acquire a feeling for the arts, and to train his intellect
by grammer and logic. Knowledge for its own sake, without regard to its purpose,
is not an educational function.
According to Yudkin, except for the politicians who must know enough science
to be able to understand the nature and the meaning of the scientific advice they
receive, the average non-scientist specialist in other fields simply has nothing to gain
by having any sCientific knowledge. We should teach elementary science, therefore,
in order to provide the necessary foundation for those children who are to be scientists, but we should not be concerned with the lack of scientific knowledge in the
specialists in other fields.
In this light, therefore, it is difficult to understand Snow's complaint of how such
a small fraction of twentieth century science has been aSSimilated into twentieth century art. For in what possible way could such scientific knowledge improve the work
of the artist?
Could the concept of the expanding universe aid the novelist or the playwright
by enhancing his sympathetic awareness of human beings? Or does Sir Charles
believe that a poet examining the effect of the threat of modern warfare on the
behavior of his contemporaries will create a finer poem if he is aware of the
mechanism of the hydrogen bomb? 38
In short, Yudkin is quite certain that the man of letters in no way improves his skill
by a knowledge of science.
Further, continues Yudkin, to think that communication between the scientists and
the artists would be improved if the former were to read Dickens and the latter were
to acquaint themselves with scientific facts is to view communication as a very abstract and impersonal affair. But this notion is to be expected of Snow, for the same
limited idea of communication is exemplified in his novels, especially in a recent one,
The Affair, in which the characters are presented as impersonal types rather than
as real individuals.
Yudkin concludes his essay by pointing out that the program of education suggested
by Snow, whereby more engineers would be made available to help industrialize the
under-developed countries, would make the gap between the two cultures wider and
wider. For the cost of training enough scientists for such a vast undertaking would
be enormous; the cost of giving all these men a humanistic education in addition
to their scientific training makes such a program simply out of the question. As a
matter of fact, because of the unceasing demands for more scientists by government
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and industry, there already is an abnormally high proportion of science students
in the universities. If this trend continues, the problem of the two cultures will cease
to exist, for one of the two cultures will have ceased to exist. On this note Yudkin
concludes his essay.
Continuing with our examination of representative comments on the Snow-Leavis
affair, there is Charles Siepmann's review of Snow's lecture, "Judgment Day for the
Modern Mind," in the Saturday Review of January 30, 1960. Siepmann regards
the lecture as half-true and half-false, as being a sloppy diagnosis of the situation,
but useful as a shock treatment. He notes that the same subject had been treated in
a better way by Oppenheimer in his Columbia lectures, "Prospects in the Arts &
Sciences." Siepmann concedes that Snow's criticism of the western world's failure to
educate enough scientists to help the under-developed countries is "massive, welldeployed, and ominous." 39
The Saturday Review of March 4, 1961, contains two pieces concerning Snow. In
a brief biography, "A Literary Owl Who Doesn't Give a Hoot," Alan Gardner sums
up his estimate of Snow as follows:
This large, bald Englishman has the intellect of a professor; the confidence of
a soothsayer; the erudition of a top-flight statesman; the devil-may-care approach
of a warm blooded novelist; the hardsell technique of a successful businessman. 40
In the other article, "The Truth About Churchill's Aide," Sir Robert Watson-Watt,
the inventor of radar, is not so generous in his praise. Referring to Snow's Harvard
lectures, "Science and Government," he charges Snow with haVing distorted the facts
in his account of the role played by the English physicist Frederick Lindemann in
helping to plan England's war-time defense system. Sir Robert wonders if perhaps
Snow's whole thinking is not more fictional than factual. 41
In the BuLLetin of the Atomic Scientists for October, 1961, lloyd Fallers has an
article called "C. P. Snow and the Third Culture." Fallers points out that Snow seems
to be utterly ignorant of a third culture, namely that constituted by the social SCiences,
"in which humanistic and scientific modes of thought are inextricably intertwined
and which thus form a natural bridge over the chasm which so concerns him." 42 Because of this ignorance, Snow necessarily exaggerates the chasm between the scientific
and the humanistic cultures.
Further, says Fallers, Snow's fascination with technology makes him think that
modernizing a traditional society is merely a technological problem, a matter of
applying the scientific reason. This was the naive view of the utopian dreamers of
the past, the J acobins, the Bolsheviks, and now the Chinese Communists. We should
now realize that such a narrow view leads only to the ruthless oppression of totalitarianism. Snow, in short, must learn the social sciences in order to appreciate the
importance of the human element in any social change, that human element which
is embodied in human institutions, human customs, and human traditions. The comparatively new social sciences, being a syntheSiS of the humanistic and the scientific
modes of understanding human society and culture, are thus the obvious means of
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bringing together the scientific and humanistic cultures.
After the publication of the Leavis lecture, various articles and reviews taking sides
with Snow or Leavis began to appear. In "Operation Snow Removal," appearing in
the National Review of March 27, 1962, William Buckley refers disparagingly to
Snow as the writer of ponderous, micl.dlebrow, pseudo-philosophic novels, and praises
Leavis for his thoughtful criticism and for having pointed out the need of the possession of our full humanity in order to cope with the complex problems of the future. 43
In "The Voice of Sir Charles," appearing in the May 22,1962, issue of the same
periodical, Buckley takes Snow to task for certain statements made by him at a New
York banquet. Snow was reported to have said that the United States and Russia
really have a lot in common and he personally could be happy living in either country . Buckley interprets such statements as indicating a soft attitude toward Russia on
Snow's part and as blurring the vision of the essential difference between the United
States and Russia. Buckley then repeats his praise of Leavis for haVing demolished
Sn{)w's literary reputation. 44
The opposite point of view is expressed in Science of March 30, 1962. According
to H . Margolis, Leavis is most unclear in what he proposes against the technological
program of Snow. Leavis makes vague references to the importance of "intuitive responses" and " human living, " and he makes the 0 bscure statement that a university
should be "a center of consciousness and conscience for our civilization," but he leaves
us pretty much in the dark as to just what he really has in mind . Margolis further
censures Leavis for the cruelty of his attack on Snow and quotes with approval from
a letter by Lord Boothby, who had said, "Lea vis is spewing out the reptilian venom
of those who have created nothing, and are concerned only to wreak vengeance upon
those who have, and thus assuage their own sense of frustration." 45 The same Lord
Boothby is also reported to have said, "There are plenty of beetles in Cambridge;
but, without doubt, Dr. Leavis has now qualified for the post of Chief Beetle. " 46
In The World of C. P Snow, a volume in praise of the scientist-novelist, Robert
Greacen defends his hero against what he regards as an unwarranted attack by "this
angry, intolerant don." After quoting a number of both literary figures and scientists
who had expressed themselves in favor of Snow, Greacen adds his own opinion that
"on the rare occasions when Dr. Leavis deviates into lucid prose his vulgar overstatement makes one doubt whether he had anything of importance to convey to his
listeners at Cambridge." 47
One of the most balanced critical reviews of the two lectures appeared in Commentary
of June, 1962. This article, "Science, Literature & Culture," by Lionel Trilling, was
reprinted in a book of readings, Th e Scientist Vs. The Humanist. 48 At the outset of
his essay, Trilling notes that, although neither Snow nor Leavis mentions the fact,
Matthew Arnold 's Rede Lecture of 1882, Literature and SCience, was on the very same
subject as that of the present dispute, and that the positions of Leavis and Snow correspond very closely to those of Arnold and Thomas Huxley over eighty years ago.
Trilling proceeds to dismiSS most of the published letters and comments which
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had appeared after the Leavis lecture as either "personality mongering" or as "expressing small and rather untidy passions," 49 but he admits that this lecture is bad
on at least two counts. It is bad in a personal sense, because of its cruelty; and it
is bad in an intellectual sense, because, by giving way to his desire to wound, Leavis
diverts attention from those ideas expressed in Snow 's lecture which really deserved
his censure.
Thus, if Leavis believes intensely, as Matthew Arnold had before him, that literature
is the "criticism oflife" and that the human faculty to which it is primarily addressed
is the moral consciousness, then he should have responded more directly to Snow's
denial of this belief - for Snow's lecture is nothing else than an indictment of literature
on both social and moral grounds.
Trilling then proceeds to give his own criticism of Snow's lecture. He marvels at
the many virtues of the scientists and the many corresponding vices of the men of
literature as delineated by Snow, particularly the scientific virtue of haVing the future
in their bones and the corresponding literary vice of wishing the future did not exist.
In the opinion of Trilling, Snow 's reference to Orwell's 1984 as an example of the
literary man's wish that the future did not exist is evidence that he missed the whole
point of that novel. What Orwell was really trying to show us was that political tyranny can pervert and debase anything to its own ends, science as well as literature.
N ext, Snow's identification of the traditional culture with the literary culture, followed
by his statement that it is this literary culture which manages the western world, is
bewildering.
The actions of parliaments and congresses and cabinets in directing the massive
affairs of state, the negotiations of embassies, the movement of armies and fleets,
the establishment of huge scientific projects for the contrivance of armaments
and of factories for the production of them, the promises made to citizens, and
the choices made by voters at the polls - these, we are asked to believe, are in
the charge of literature. What can this mean? 50
It is true, of course, that literature has had a definite influence in the course of the
history of the western world; but that it manages that part of the world is too far
fetched.
As a matter of fact, and contrary to Snow's judgment, literary men like Coleridge,
Carlyle, Mill, Dickens, Ruskin, Arnold, and William Morris did help deCiSively to
bring about significant changes for the better in the condition of the working men
in Industrial England. No great English writer of the nineteenth century, once he became aware of the Industrial Revolution, ever "contracted out," to use Snow's expression.
Turning to Snow's views on education, Trilling remarks that, despite all he says
about the need to educate ourselves, he "does not make a Single substantive proposal about education." 5 1 In regard to those students who do not intend to be scientists, his only remark is that ignorance of the Second Law of Thermodynamics is
equivalent to ignorance of Shakespeare; about those who intend to be scientists, he
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does not propose anything except science.
EVidently, because the literary culture has been responsible for all the anomalies,
stupidities, and crimes of the Western World, it must be completely supplanted. This
same blindness to any value other than scientific knowledge leads Snow to make the
outlandish claim that it is the scientific culture, not the literary culture, which will
transcend national and ideological differences, and enable the western nations to join
hands with the Soviet Union in doing what the governments have not done, namely,
the work of relieving the misery of the world.
But, says Trilling, the world is certainly not going to be saved by some single
thing, even SCience, espeCially if this concentration on one thing makes us ignore the
actuality of politics, as Snow plainly does . In fact, any discussion of the relative
merits of sCientific philosopher kings as against literary philosopher kings is a purely
academic pastime so long as politics goes on living its own autonomous life.
Turning again to Leavis, Trilling repeats his earlier remark that he did a poor
job in stating the case for literature. For example, he should have pointed out that
the reactionary tendencies of the literary masters of the first thirty years of this century were not shared by their readers. Actually, during this same period the educated
class became more and more liberal in its attitudes toward social legislation, planning, and international cooperation. The educated readers were intelligent enough
to distinguish between the tale and the teller of the tale and to realize that when certain liberal ideas were criticized by these writers, it was not the ideas in their pure
state, but in their bogus, counterfeit form that the writers attacked.
Further, Leavis should have pointed out that the passionate hostility toward society
on the part of the writers is not necessarily indicative of the decline of the West. It
could very well be " an act of critical energy on the part of society itself - the effort
to understand afresh the nature of the life it is deSigned to foster." 52 The truth of
the matter, says Trilling, is that Leavis, because he is just as hostile to most modern
writers for his own reasons as Snow is for his, cannot in good grace come to their
defense on such a basis.
In the last analysis, in the opinion of Trilling, tlle whole tone of the Richmond
Lecture is parochial. For instead of being an attack upon the real fallacy of the Snow
lecture (that scientists will be the saviors of the world), it is merely a statement of
preference for one culture over another. What is worse, Leavis implies that the members of each culture constitute a definite class. Accordingly, in opposition to the quasi·
aristocratic, metropolitan middle-class attracted by Snow's ideas, he would like to
organize certain gifted and conscious people into a new social class "formed on the
basis of its serious understanding of a response to literature, chiefly English lit·
erature." 53 For such an elite, literature is not merely an "amusement of the soul, "
but the principal means by which mankind attains full intelligent use of its full
humanity.
Trilling blames both Snow and Leavis for basing their respective judgments on
what he calls "the cultural mode of thought." By this he seems to mean the modern
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tendency to evaluate ideas on the basis of the " life-style" of the social group which
espouses them, the tendency to make moral criticism a matter of class taste. Trilling
thinks that this cultural mode of thought, for which Marx, Freud, and modern existentialism are mainly responsible, is exhibited in Snow 's attitude when he "envisages
a new and very powerful social class on the basis of a life-style which he imputes
to a certain profession in contrast with the life~ style he imputes to another profession. " 54 This same mode of thought is seen in Leavis when, in a passion of personal
scorn, he answers Snow in what is simply an eloquent statement of preference for a
different cultural class characterized by a different life-style.
To replace this sentimental reliance on feelings or taste, Trilling looks forward to
the day when Mind will be restored to its rightful position as the faculty of judgment.
For Mind is not a faculty peculiar to this or that profession , or social class, or culture group, but to Man; and because it is possible for all men to learn its proper
use, it is by this proper use that they can communicate with each other. The great
Faraday refused to be called "physicist," because he thought it was too narrow a
term as connoting a special profession or class. He preferred to be called " philosopher," a term connoting a spacious generality and thus more befitting one who
regarded himself as a "man speaking to men. "
Neither Snow nor Leavis were pleased by Trilling's essay. In the prefatory note
to the American edition of his lecture to which we have already referred, Leavis mentions this essay as an example of the many others which had missed the point of
what he was trying to say. In an article which appeared in the London Tim es Literary
Supplement of October 25, 1963 , and which we will presently examine, Snow says
he was perplexed by Trilling's essay, particularly by Trilling 's criticism of his views
on literature, views which he does not hold at all.
In April of 1963 two articles definitely anti-Leavis in nature appeared in American
periodicals. In the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists for that month, Mary S. Simpson
called the attack by Leavis " waspish ." Further, his alternative proposal is presented
in a "text so bewildering that it is difficult to confidently paraphrase it or even single
out quotations which will best convey the gist." 55 Finally, although it seems that it
is a " religious depth of thought and feeling that he hints at, the altars appear to be
empty and the gods inscrutable ... " 56
The other anti-Leavis article, "The Dog That Didn't Bark, " appeared in the N ew
Republic of April 13, 1963. The author, Hilary Corke, has a few things to say about
Snow, but most of his remarks concern Leavis. He thinks that Snow's lecture was
"neither very original, nor very deeply thought out, nor very memorably expressed ." 57 But, although on the "woolly " side, it was felt to be useful. As a matter
of fact, says Corke, Snow's lecture is what would be expected of a wide but comparatively shallow mind, one that is not very perceptive over details, but capable
of forming and retaining a well-balanced picture of the entire field.
In regard to Leavis, however, Corke can discover no merit whatsoever. He calls
his attack on Snow one of "an uncontrolled virulence of fury," a "frenetic savaging,"
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"pure hysteria." The attack "seems marvelously incisive and drastic so long as it
keeps within general items, but fades and shies curiously whenever it descends to
particulars." 58 As Dame Edith Sitwell had said, his words reveal an envy of Snow's
popularity, of his ability to write good English, and of his influence in government
and university circles. In the final analysis, says Corke, Leavis is an excluder, "a
heretic-burner for whom the Great Tradition is a matter of a dozen novelists or so ...
a literary fascist who would condemn all who don't agree with his narrow view of
what is good and true." 59
We should also make reference to an article by D. S. Greenberg in Science of October 4, 1963. Although this article is not directly concerned with the Snow-Leavis feud,
it does have an interesting account of certain reactions to Snow's views on the role
of the scientist in public affairs. Greenberg points out that Snow's famous lecture as
well as his other lectures and articles have provoked widespread attention to the problem of how scientific knowledge can best be brought into the formulation of national
policy. He deplores the attitude of some scientists who seem to think that political
infallibility is an unavoidable by-product of their professional training, but he is also
of the opinion that the discussion of this problem by the non-scientists has degenerated
into such nonsensical remarks as "rule by scientist-kings." 60
Greenberg proceeds to take issue with several prominent persons who have recently
made some rather harsh statements about Snow in particular and scientists in general.
Robert M. Hutchins, for example, has said that scientists in public affairs actually
have lower moral standards than non-scientists. In general, "professors are somewhat worse than other people, and scientists are somewhat worse than other professors." 61 This is because men are honest within their own field (where they are
subject to the scrutiny of their peers); but as a scientist specializes more and more,
the areas where he has no peers to check him grow larger and larger and so do his
opportunities for dishonesty. Greenberg denies these charges and claims that scientists
are neither more or less honest than other people. For example, he points out, scientists, just as much as other people, were divided on the morality of dropping the
bomb on Japan.
To Scott Buchanan's accusation that scientists have no sense of social responsibility,
being concerned only with whatever is useful regardless of what for, Greenberg contends that scientists do have moral feelings, and that the question of their culpability
in the matter of modern weapons or destruction is simply part of the ancient problem
of the individual conscience versus the demands of organized sOciety. 62
Greenberg next refers to David Lilienthal's remarks that scientists are trying to use
methods applicable only to the physical world in the area of such human affairs as
goals, purposes, motivations and conflicts; that they have a cocksure confidence in
their ability to provide simple answers to what are extremely complex human problems. As examples of the latter, Lilienthal cites the scientists' proposals of arms control
or world government to meet the threat of nuclear war. To these charges, Greenberg
replies that they rest upon the false assumption that there is a monolithic scientific
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community whose members have no difference of opinion. On the contrary, he points
out that not every scientist thinks that the H-bomb is the answer to all military needs,
nor does every scientist advocate instant disarmament, etc. 63
Greenberg concludes his article by pointing out the undeniable fact that SCientific
knowledge is immensely useful to our national well-being and that the occasional
fallibility of scientists in giving advice to the government is not a sufficient reason for
refusing their advice altogether. The big problem we face is "how can a democracy
incorporate into its political processes a body of knowledge that is largely beyond
its comprehension?" 64
Lastly, we come to the article by Snow himself which appeared in the London Tim es
Literary Supplement of October 25, 1963. This article, which broke a four year silence
by Snow on this topic, is to be incorporated in the second edition of the Rede Lecture
to be published by Cambridge University Press and as a paperback by the New
American Library. Snow remarks at the outset that the torrent of letters, articles,
and reviews aroused by the original lecture is evidence that the ideas expressed in it
were already" in the air," and that they were basically true.
After dismissing those criticisms which had contained nothing but personal abuse
(a footnote refers speciflcally to Leavis) as not worthy of reply, and pointing out that
his statement, "Each of us dies along," had been misquoted by at least ten critics as,
"We die alone," Snow gets down to the main portions of his new essay. He defends
his use of the term" culture," because it has two meanings, both of which he intended
when he deliberately chose the word. These two meanings are (1) intellectual development, whether scientific or artistic and (2) a social group " living in the same environment, linked by common habits, common assumptions, a common way of life. " 65 He
insists that the literary intellectuals and the scientists make up two cultures in the
second meaning of the term and that there is just as much" culture" in the first meaning of the term in the scientists as there is in the literary intellectuals. Further, although he is less certain about the dichotomy of only two cultures, he thinks the
division is valid. For the sub-divisions within each culture do not destroy the basic
unity of that culture.
Snow admits that at the time of the original lecture he did not realize that the chasm
between the two cultures is not nearly as wide in the United Sta tes as it is in England.
In this country he thinks the scientists are now talking intelligibly to the non-scientists,
and science students are receiving a serious humane education in our universities. He
also admits that he has only recently become aware of what could be called a "third
culture," that composed of the social scientists. He thinks that this new culture could
very well supply the answers to many of our problems, especially those of communication between the other two cultures.
While in the apologizing mood, Snow expresses regret for haVing used the Second
Law of Thermodynamics as an example of a beautiful scientific truth of which most
non-scientists are ignorant. He now thinks that he should have used for such an example some newly discovered fact in molecular biology. He thinks that this new sci-
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ence, because of its self-contained principles and methods, the aesthetic appeal of its
subject matter, the fact that it needs very little mathematics to be understood, and the
enormous effect it will have on our future lives, would be ideal for introducing students to the nature of the sci·entific culture.
Regarding the distinction he had made in his original lecture between man's individual condition and man 's social condition, Snow repeats his conviction that, although
no one of us can do anything about changing the tragic eventuality of one 's own death,
we can do something about improving the conditions of human life, especially in those
parts of the world where human beings live" in the immediate presence of illness and
premature death." 66 It is by sharing with these people the benefits of applied science
that we can alleviate their social condition. As many have said, man does not live
by bread alone - but one must not despise the elemental needs whet'! one has been
granted them and others have not. But it is only through the scientific revolution that
people can gain the primal things of life. As a matter of fact, says Snow, he wishes
he had not changed his mind about calling his original lecture, "The Rich and the
Poor. "
In regard to his opinion of the attitude of most modern writers toward the scientific
revolution, Snow sticks to his original position. Although he admits an admiration
for Dostoevsky as a great writer, he condemns him for his reactionary social and
political views. In the same anti-social, pessimistic category, he places, among others,
Henry James, T. S. Eliot, Yeats, Pound, Joyce, Lawrence, Virginia Woolf, Wyndham
Lewis, Gide, Valery, Faulkner, and pOSSibly Thomas Mann. Snow asks the rhetorical
question, "How far is it possible to share the hopes of the sCientific revolution, the
modest difficult hopes for other human lives, and at the same time participate without
qualification in the kind of literature which has just been defined?" 67
Snow concludes his article by repeating his thesis that in a time when science is
determining much of our destiny, it is dangerous to have two cultures which cannot
communicate. In such a situation, the political decision-makers cannot judge whether
the advice given by a scientist on a crucial matter is good or bad. A change in our
educational program, although not the whole solution, is a necessary step. The
Renaissance man of universal knowledge is no longer possible, but at least "we can
educate a large proportion of our better minds so that they are not ignorant of imaginative experience, both in the arts and in SCience, nor ignorant of the endowments
of applied science, of the remediable sufferings of most of their fellow humans, and of
the responsibilities which, once they are seen, cannot be denied." 68
IV. Reflections
And so the controversy goes on. Actually, of course, Snow versus Leavis is simply
the latest installment of a debate that has been going on for centuries. As Trilling
noted in his essay, the same basic issues involved in the Snow-Leavis affair were also
present eighty years ago in the Huxley-Arnold dispute. In fact, ever since the beginnings of what we call "modern" science, there have been men of letters who have
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attacked in various ways the scientific mind and method, and on the other side there
have been the scientists who have written slightingly of the humanities. To many scientists, the poet and the playwright waste their time with inconsequential fancies; to
many men of literature, the scientist is a narrow, unimaginative recorder of facts
that have no essential bearing on the meaning and purpose of human life. For every
Swift attacking the scientists in Part Three of Gulliver 's Travels, there is a Darwin
expressing his slight regard for music and poetry in the Descent of Man.
There are examples of this mutual antipathy to be found even in ancient times. In
Athens !socrates established his school to rival Plato's Academy, because he thought
that true learning consisted of the humanistic arts of correct speech and action rather
than in the sciences of mathematics and philosophy. On his part, Plato would exclude
artists and poets from his ideal state on the grounds that their products so delight the
senses that men find it difficult to turn their minds upward to contemplate the Ideas.
Further, in his program of education for those who are to be the elite ruling class,
Plato grants music and poetry a place on the elementary level, but he makes mathematics and dialectic the only proper subjects for their higher education. Plato, of
course, denied the possibility of a strictly physical SCience, any knowledge of the
physical world being no better than "opinion" or a "likely account." On the other
hand, there is the playwright Aristophanes in his comedy, The Clouds, poking fun
at the scientific experiments conducted by Socrates in his Thoughtery.
In the ancient and medieval worlds, as we know, the modern distinction between
philosophy and science did not exist. Frequently, therefore, the opposition was between
the man of letters and the men who professed doctrines which were a mixture of philosophy and science. Further, some philosopher-scientists of the medieval period did
not distinguish clearly between reason and faith, and so in their case there was an
even more complex mixture of philosophy, SCience, and theology . It was this kind
of latter-day" Scholastic," expressing his ideas in a drab, pedantic, Latin prose, who
was so unmercifully ridiculed by the Renaissance humanists.
But the detailed history of this centuries-old feud is outside the scope of this paper.
In the present case of Sir Charles Snow and Dr. Leavis, as it has frequently happened
in the past, it is apparent that each has claimed too much for his own side and tended
to minimize the merits of the other. As the late Aldous Huxley said in the opening
lines of his book, Literature and SCience, " Snow or Leavis? The bland scientism of
The Two Cultures or, violent and ill-mannered, the one-track, moralistic literalism of
Leavis ' Richmond Lecture? If there were no other chOice, we should indeed be badly
off." 69
Snow is surely right in pleading for a greater understanding of science on the part
of members of the traditional culture, particularly the statesmen who must make such
crucial decisions in today's critical times . He is accordingly also right in saying that
in order to give our leaders a greater knowledge of science and to prOVide more
scientists to help the non-western nations to develop their resources, our educational
program must give more emphaSiS to science. But he is mistaken if he presumes
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that a general increase in scientific knowledge will of itself be the salvation of mankind. Science and technology are indispensable for improving the human condition
in Africa, Asia, and South America, but the political and social problems that must
be solved for this scientific revolution to take place are not going to be solved simply
by the application of the scientific method, even that of the social sciences. In the
words of Dr. Hugh S. Taylor of Princeton University,
Science knowing little of ultimate causes cannot determine ends nor can it direct
society to ends which are external to its discipline. That is why in matters concerning ends, peace, justice, liberty, or any others heart's desire, the scientist as
scientist cannot be and is in fact not conspicuously superior to other educated
men ... Indeed, it may justly be said that, to the extent that the scientist is
ignorant of .. . philosophy, of art and of the humanities, he may well be a
danger to society precisely because of that ignorance. The success which attends
his method of abstraction in the solution of a scientific problem may make him
susceptible to solutions of human conduct or national welfare in which important
elements in the problem, personal, social, political have been ignored by him
as scientist. 70
In the western countries where the scientific revolution is already a going thing, we
are beginning to realize that the wonders of science and technology create almost as
many problems as they solve. Medical science prevents more and more untimely
deaths and enables all of us to live longer; but all tllis adds more dynamite to the
population explosion - which in the opinion of many is the most serious of all our
problems. Psychology, SOciology, and the other social sciences tell us more and more
about the human mind and human behavior patterns; but this same knowledge can
become an evil weapon in the hands of the demagogue, the brainwasher, the corrupt
advertiser, and other agents of psychic violence. Physical science has discovered how
to release the power of the atom; but now we have the problem of survival in the
eventuality of a thermonuclear holocaust. Science is replacing at a constantly accelerated pace both human muscular power and human brain power with automated
factories and thinking machines, but the dream of a utopian leisure with its opportunities for the cultivation of things of the spirit is becoming a nightmare of unemployment for some and plain boredom for others. The political and moral problems created by science simply cannot be solved by science.
On the other hand, Dr. Leavis is surely right in extolling the value of the arts,
particularly literature, in making us aware of our common humanity, of our cultural
heritage, and in making us sensitive to the moral and spiritual dimensions of ourselves and our fellow men. But he also overstates his case. The artist's power to move
us, to evoke our feelings of pity and fear, to make us feel more deeply and to see in
extraordinary ways the existential circumstances of human life, is a wonderful gift.
But it is a power that follows upon a certain vision of reality, and depending on that
vision the artist can use this power to debase as well as to elevate, to show man as
a depraved animal as well as something a little less than the angels. Although Matthew
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Arnold's notion that literature is a "criticism oflife" is sound, the ultimate principles
which underlie this criticism and give it validity are truths of an order more fundamental than the order of art and literature. Nor is this order that of science. In a
recent book, Science: The Glorious Entertainment, Jacques Barzun points out that
modern art has failed to provide a criticism of the" mechanical wasteland." According
to the review of this book in Newsweek, Barzun thinks this failure is a consequence
of the "conception that art should be an adjunct of science in the investigation of the
human psyche rather than a celebration of the human imagination." 71
The more fundamental order which supports both the arts and the sciences has to
be the order of wisdom. In his article, "Scientist and Humanist: Can the Minds
Meet?," 72 Dr. 1. 1. Rabi agrees that wisdom is what we need. His notion, however,
that wisdom is something that will result from blending the sciences and the humanities in the minds of individual men and women is of questionable validity. Although
there must be a greater fuSion of knowledge in our universities through interdisciplinary programs, wisdom is not just a by-product of such a blending. Wisdom is
that distinctive knowledge identified with metaphysics and theology.
In the last analysis, both the arts and the sciences are activities of man; but man
is a philosophical and religiOUS animal before he is an artist or scientist. It is preCisely because he has certain beliefs about God, about himself, and about the universe
as a whole, that he is impelled to learn more about these things in science and to
express these beliefs in artistic forms. That truth is a good, that the human mind can
know truth; that beauty is a good, that to create and enjoy beauty ennobles the human
spirit - these are metaphysical and theological truths which are presupposed by science and art. In the words ofH. J. Muller, "it (SCience) realizes our rich heritage as
children of this earth. Like Christian theology, moreover, it assumes that the heritage
is lawful. Science grew out of the medieval faith that the world is orderly and rational,
and that all happenings in it could be explained." 73
It is only by the wisdom of a realist metaphysics and a sound theology that we
even have an inkling of the purposes of human life, of the essential relations which
exist between man and his physical environment, between man and man, and between man and God. It is only the wise man who has a vision of the whole and
therefore can see the ordered relation of the parts. It is only the wise man, therefore;who can see the proper place of both science and art in the affairs of men and who
can judge of them in respect to both the temporal and the eternal ends of human
life. In an address delivered at the M.LT. in December of 1960, MonSignor William
J. McDonald, Rector of the Catholic University of America, said:
It is probably not an exaggeration to say that the deepest problems of mankind lie outside the domain of science ... Whatever our need for science our
need for wisdom is still greater. To the "what" and the "how" must be added
the "why" and the "wherefore." We must try to revive and encourage others to
cultivate virtues, namely, wisdom, which is the faculty for establishing order. 74
Both scientific knowledge and artistic intuition relate to that which is. But man is
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also a person, a moral being, and in his proper domain of intelligence and freedom
he must have that wisdom by which he knows what ought to be and by which he
can prescribe for both the arts and the sciences their true finalities, their true reason
for being. In another part of his address Monsignor McDonald asserts,
We must not ask of science more than science is prepared to give; science can
give us sound methodology; it can liberate us from what Maritain calls "grubby
resisting matter." But science can not give us either a philosophy of life or the
wisdom to see that science's fruits are used well. 75
This is not the place to define in more detailed terms what this wisdom is. In general
terms, for western civilization at least, it is essentially that vision of man and of his
relation to God and the universe which is our heritage from Greece and Rome and
from the Judaic-Christian religious tradition. In this tradition man is looked upon
as a being endowed with reason, as haVing an immortal soul made to the image
and likeness of God Himself, and therefore as being not just a speck of cosmic dust,
but the central figure in the whole scheme of the history of the universe. 76
This high regard for man is the vision of traditional wisdom is expressed by Doctor
H. Austin Taylor, Professor of Chemistry at New York University:
The major contribution which St. Thomas, as philosopher, would give to the
scientist today desirous of'the complete and harmonious view ' is the same made
in the 13th century, that the scientist's view of the universe must involve not
alone the material universe but also man ... The center and unifying principle
of the universe is man . The integration of science and philosophy must result
from deeper study of the age-old problem of man as the center of the universe.
This accumulated wisdom of the centuries is certainly not to be thought of as a
finished accomplishment, but rather as a living body of philosophic and religiOUS
truths which grows and develops within the dynamism of time and history. Nor should
it be thought that this wisdom is something which can take the place of the arts and
the sciences. They have the autonomy proper to their own natures, and they serve
man best when he respects those natures. Rather, this wisdom enables man to understand the true nature and purpose of these instruments for his intellectual and moral
growth .
It is by participating in a common wisdom, a common philosophy of man and
of things human, that artists and scientists can have a basis for communication, and
thereby make it possible for the two or more cultures to be integrated in the one
society of human beings. It behooves us, therefore, to preserve and strengthen this
wisdom where it still exists, and to re-discover it where it has been lost. Finally,
should not Catholic universities, the chief repositories of traditional wisdom, be foremost in the work of establishing the lines of communication between the two or more
cultures?
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